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Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT QF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 
2a, Section 3(2) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant's nature of the proceedings statement is incorrect, in that the judgment 
appealed from was not a judgment by default but rather a judgment following a bench 
trial. Appellant erroneously defines the judgment as one by default. 
TSSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Appellant states three issues for review: First, did the trial court employ the 
proper procedures in entering a forfeiture judgment? Second, did the trial court commit 
error in applying the wrong legal standard to the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment? 
Third, did the trial court commit error in entering findings of fact in support of the 
motion to withdraw judgment that were not supported by the record? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appeals from a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
app. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9)(f) through (h). 
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint 
or petition for release, the court shall examine the record 
and if no answer is on file, the court shall allow the 
complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present 
evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or 
release of the property as the court determines. If the 
county attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for 
release and the court determines from the evidence that the 
petitioner is not entitled to a recovery of the property, it 
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to 
answer the petition within ten days. If no answer is filed 
within that period, the court shall order the release of the 
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition 
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court shall set 
the matter for hearing within 20 days. At this hearing all 
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of 
release of the property following the state's evidence for 
forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture 
or release of the property as it determines. 
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(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of 
any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under 
this act or the laws of this state. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic 
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant 
as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to 
appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment 
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
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Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact 
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either (1) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take 
judicial notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A Court shall take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the 
necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled 
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to 
the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the 
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the 
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or 
proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as 
conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, 
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not 
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially 
noticed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a forfeiture proceeding in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Millard County, Utah. A Forfeiture Complaint, Notice of Seizure and 
Intent to Forfeit were filed in the Fourth District Court for Millard County on January 
11, 1989. (R. 1-5) An Answer was filed on behalf ofAppellant on January 27, 1989. 
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(R. 12-13) Trial was originally scheduled for February 28,1990. (R. 16) The trial was 
continued (R. 21) and ultimately rescheduled to January 30, 1991. (R. 34) Neither 
Appellant nor Counsel appeared on that date. (R. 38) Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were originally entered on January 30,1991. (R. 44-46) Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on February 8,1991. (R. 50-52) 
A Judgment of Forfeiture was entered against Appellant on January 30,1991. (R. 44-
46) On July 22, 1992, Appellant made a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. 
(R. 53-54) That Motion was denied after a hearing. (R. 91-92) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellee does not necessarily dispute the Statement of Facts offered by 
Appellant in his brief. Provided however that the Appellee will add the fact that in the 
criminal case referred to, State v. SmalL Millard County District Court, No. 1113, the 
Defendant, Appellant herein, filed and had heard amotion for probable cause for stay 
pending an appeal. The Motion was heard before Judge Ballif on June 22, 1990. (A 
transcript of the hearing is attached as appendix #1.) The Defendant was present and 
was represented by Stephen McCaughey, Esquire. The following exchange between the 
Court and Mr. McCaughey took place. (See page 14, line 22 and 23 of the transcript.) 
"The Court: and Mr. McCaughey 
Mr. McCaughey: Steve McCaughey 
The Court: Right. You're taking over for Mr. 
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Mr. McCaughey: I am. Mr. Hatch has been in the hospital that last two 
weeks. 
The Court: How's he doing? 
Mr. McCaughey: He's pretty serious. They don't know whether he'll be out 
or not. He's been there for two weeks, so I agreed to 
represent Mr. Small in this. 
The Court: All right." 
The record will show that Mr. Stephen McCaughey, Esquire, has represented Mr. Small 
ever since that time. Mr. Small was also present. (See page 14, line 22 and 23 of the 
transcript. 
SUMMARY QF THE REBUTTAL ARGUMENTS 
The trial Court properly took judicial notice of the related criminal trial referred 
to above, as the evidence in support of Plaintiffs forfeiture case. It is important to note 
that Judge George E. Ballif conducted both the related criminal case and this forfeiture 
case. 
The trial Court, meaning Judge Lynn Davis, (Judge Ballif had since retired and 
Judge Davis took over his department in the Fourth Judicial District Court), properly 
applied the right standard in detennining appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
made pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). Even if a different standard had been applied the 
result would have been the same. 
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The trial Court's finding that Appellant was aware of Mr. Hatch's inability to 
practice law was correct where it was a matter of official record in the related criminal 
case that Defendant Small knew on June 22,1990 that Mr. Hatch was incapacitated, 
which was long before the forfeiture case was tried. This is particularly true because it 
was pointed out to the Court during the hearing and by Memorandum filed by the State 
in response to Claimant's Affidavit. 
This appeal is an exercise in futility because the action is an In Rem proceeding. 
The res was a car and cash. Both are gone, there is nothing for this Court or the trial 
Court to exercise jurisdiction over. Claimant did not appeal the Judgment of 
Forfeiture. He filed a motion to set it aside, and now appeals the trial Court's denial. 
The Court's denial of the Motion to Set Aside can also be supported by the provision 
of U.R.C.P. Rule 12(c) or Rule 56. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court properly took judicial notice based on his personal knowledge of the 
facts. 
On the date set for the forfeiture trial neither the Claimant not his Counsel 
appeared to represent his interests. (R. 50) The trial Court took judicial notice of the 
evidence that was introduced at the Claimant's criminal trial. (R. 50) Based on the 
judicial notice and the pleadings the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of Law. No transcripts of the criminal trial were introduced into evidence as part of the 
request to take judicial notice. A judgment was then entered for the Plaintiff. (R. 47) 
The record shows that Judge George E. Ballif was the Judge who heard the forfeiture 
trial. It is also a matter of record that Judge Ballif was also the Judge who conducted 
the jury trial, in case no. 1113, State vs. Small. (See also State vs. Small 819 P.2d 129.) 
It is obvious that Judge Ballif had personally heard all the evidence surrounding the case 
during the course of the criminal case. No transcript was necessary for the Court to 
have full knowledge of the Plaintiffs case. 
In Appellant's argument Point I, he argues that the forfeiture statute has no 
provision for a default judgment. Herein lies Appellant's error. The judgment was not 
a default judgment. It was a judgment following a trial setting and following trial: the 
Court simply took judicial knowledge of the facts that he had already heard during the 
recent criminal trial, and since there was no other evidence presented he entered 
Judgment of Forfeiture. Since the Judgment was not a default judgment Appellant's 
argument on this point is moot. 
In fact the Court followed the relevant portion of the statute. U.C. A.§58-37-
13(9)(g) provides when there is an answer (there was one filed by Appellant through his 
counsel), the Court shall set the matter for hearing (which the Court did). At this 
hearing all interested parties may present evidence of their rights following the State's 
evidence for forfeiture. The State had presented evidence through judicial notice but the 
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Claimant and Appellant Small did not avail himself of his right to present evidence. 
Thus the Court determined by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and 
ordered forfeiture. Contrary to Appellant's erroneously based argument, the Court did 
follow the statute. 
In this case Judge Ballif heard all the facts of the case during the trial of 
Appellant in the Criminal Case, State v. Small. He was also the Judge who handled the 
forfeiture side of the case. Cash, and a car possessed in the criminal case by Appellant 
were the subject matter in the forfeiture case. All of the facts were within the personal 
knowledge of Judge Ballif. There was no need for a transcript. Even if there was it was 
readily available as an official record in the Fourth District Court records in criminal 
case no. 1113. However, Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not require that 
a transcript be filed. The Rule governs judicial notice of facts, either generally known 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court or capable of accurate and ready 
determination. 
Since the facts were within the personal knowledge of the Judge, each of these 
criteria are met, and the Court was authorized by the statue to take judicial notice 
whether requested to do so or not. The supplying of information under subdivision (d) 
obviously refers to a situation where the information is available and within the rule, 
but just not obvious or within the personal knowledge of the judge to whom the request 
is made. In that situation the facts need be supplied to the judge. 
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Riche v. Riche 784 P.2d 265 does not hold otherwise: the Court in Riche did not 
define what was meant by "the same case". Obviously a temporary custody hearing was 
considered the "same case" as the later trial. But they were for separate purposes. This 
is similar in nature to this case where the forfeiture trial and the criminal trial were 
conducted for different purposes. By nature the facts in both the criminal trial and the 
forfeiture trial were essentially the same, and therefore also the "same case". Also in 
Riche the Court upheld the trial court refusal to take judicial notice of the temporary 
custody hearing evidence, not because a transcript was not provided, but because the 
party (husband) did not request it at the time. 
In fact the Court's statement concerning judicial notice in Rieha supports Judge 
Ballif s taking of judicial notice in this forfeiture case of the facts he had heard in the 
criminal case. In Riche the Court said: 
"Husband correctly asserts that courts are required 
to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts if a party 
requests it and supplies the court with the necessary 
information. Utah Rules of Evidence 201(d). Courts may 
take judicial notice of the records and prior proceedings in 
the same case." 
POINT II 
Irregardless of the standard applied by trial Court in addressing Appellant's 
Motion to Withdraw Judgment, the trial Court's ruling must be upheld. 
Appellant moved the trial Court to set aside the Judgment pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
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60(b)(7). It is based on the premises and claim that Appellant's Counsel Sumner Hatch 
was ineffective or incompetent because he was sick, ill, or incapacitated. In the first 
place the motion would be one more properly brought pursuant to sub paragraph (b) 
(1), which would be surprise or excusable neglect, not (b)(7). In such cases if the motion 
is not well taken under the proper sub-section it must be denied. (See Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman817P.2d 382. In Richins v. Chipman the Court said "...subsection (7) should 
be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the court only in unusual and exceptional 
circumstances...." 
"...Rule 60 (b)(7) is not available to one who should have filed under Rule 
60(b)(1) but did not., .we find that because subsection (1) applies, subdivision (7) cannot 
apply, and may not be used to circumvent the three month filing period." 
Really, what Appellant is claiming is that he was surprised to find Sumner Hatch 
did not take care of the matter, or that Plaintiff took advantage of surprise when it 
proceeded to trial and judgment under the circumstances. Here Appellant's Motion 
should have been made under subsection (b)(1) but it was not made within three months 
of entry of the judgment, and therefore it must be denied. He should have claimed Rule 
60(b)( 1) which would have been untimely and he cannot use Rule 60(b)(7) to circumvent 
his failure. 
Next, in the criminal case of State v. Small Millard County District Court case 
no. 1113 a motion for a certificate of probable cause on appeal was heard before Judge 
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George E. Ballif, in Provo, Utah on June 22.1990. This occurred after the Defendant 
Small (claimant in this forfeiture case) had been convicted, was sentenced to prison, but 
sought a certificate of probable cause staying sentence while he appealed his conviction. 
Stephen McCaughey, Esquire, appeared on behalf of Defendant and Claimant 
Lemuel Thomas Small. A transcript of the said hearing was prepared by Court 
Reporter Lesley S. Nelson dated September 24, 1990. At page 2, line 25 of that 
transcript, the Court and Mr. McCaughey exchanged the following conversation. It is 
important to note that Mr. Small was present in Court and also heard the following 
exchange. (See page 14, line 22 and 23 of the transcript) 
"The Court: and Mr. McCaughey 
Mr. McCaughey: Steve McCaughey 
The Court: Right. You're taking over for Mr. 
Mr. McCaughey: I am. Mr. Hatch has been in the hospital that last two 
weeks. 
The Court: How's he doing? 
Mr. McCaughey: He's pretty serious. They don't know whether he'll be out 
or not. He's been there for two weeks, so I agreed to 
represent Mr. Small in this. 
The Court: All right." 
The record will show that Mr. Stephen McCaughey, Esquire, has represented Mr. Small 
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ever since that time. 
Claimant's Motion to set aside on a "failure of Counsel argument", i.e. that 
Sumner Hatch failed to properly represent Claimant due to illness and consequent 
incapacity under these facts. The Judgment of Forfeiture was entered on February 8, 
1991. Both Claimant Small and his present counsel Stephen McCaughey knew that 
Sumner Hatch was ill and incapacitated nearly eight months prior to the entry of 
judgment. They both knew six months prior to the trial date. It is only logical that Mr. 
Small, and his new attorney, both were on notice that action needed to be taken in the 
forfeiture action, if Mr. Small wanted to protect his interest. He had the knowledge, 
duty, and time to act long before the matter was set for trial and judgment was entered. 
The burden was on Claimant Small, because of his knowledge, concerning Mr. Hatch's 
incapacity. In U.S. v. Woburn 928 F.2d 1, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, had this to say about a claimant that wanted to avoid a judgment because 
of gross neglect of his former counsel. This is the same argument advanced by Claimant 
Small in this case. 
"The final argument of claimant is that Rule 60 
(b)(6) should be applied because of the gross neglect of its 
former counsel. Such a claim has generally been rejected 
by the Supreme Court: 
'There is certainly no merit to the contention that 
dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's 
unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the 
client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his 
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representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the 
consequences of he acts or omissions of this freely selected 
agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent 
with our system of representative litigation, in which each 
party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and 
is considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which 
can be charged upon the attorney.' Smith v. Ayer, 101 
U.S. 320, 326, 25 L. Ed. 955." 
This principal of law is particularly applicable to this case, where claimant Small 
kngffilong before any judgment of forfeiture was entered, that his original counsel was 
ill and incapacitate. 
POINT III 
The trial Court properly found that the Appellant was aware of Sumner Hatch's 
mental disability. 
The Appellant argues that the Court's finding that the Appellant knew of 
Sumner Hatch's disability was done without any basis for the finding. Appellant is in 
error. The Motion to Set Aside was filed and supported by Affidavits and 
Memorandum written by Appellant's Attorney. 
In response the State filed it's Memorandum Opposing Claimant's 
Memorandum and Affidavits in support of his Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
(Attached hereto as appendix #2.) The Memorandum, appendix #2, clearly sets out the 
exchange between Judge Ballif and Steven McCaughey on June 22,1990 at the probable 
cause hearing in State vs. Small, case no. 1113. Thus by reference to the transcript in 
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case number 1113, and by quote that exchange was before the Court showing that both 
Claimant Small and his new attorney both knew about Sumner Hatch's disability long 
before the trial. Thus the trial Court, in hearing the Motion to Set Aside, had a 
substantial basis for finding that Claimant and Appellant Small knew about Hatch's 
disability. 
POINT IV 
Forfeiture is an In Rem proceeding. Action lies against the Res or item itself, 
rather than against the owner or a person. See U.C.A. §58-32-13(9)(h), and see 36 
AmJur 2d§l page 611. There is no question but that the Court had jurisdiction over the 
ResaX the trial and subsequent forfeiture judgment. It is pointed out that in this case 
the Res was a 1977 Cadillac and $8,234.10 in cash. The car and cash are gone, once 
forfeited and turned over to the agency the Res is gone. No appeal was filed by 
Claimant, appealing the Judgment of Forfeiture. This appeal is from the Court's denial 
of a "Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment". (There really was no "default 
judgment" but rather a judgment following a trial setting.) The Res no longer is in the 
control of the Court, and the Court has no jurisdiction over the car and money. In 
essence the question of setting aside the Judgment is moot. Even if the Judgment is set 
aside there is not longer a iteswithin the jurisdiction of the Court. There does not seem 
to be any Utah Appellate cases on this point but see U.S.A. vs. Tit's Lounge 873 F.2d 
141. Since the lower Court has lost jurisdiction to proceed any further, Claimant's 
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appeal must be dismissed. 
POINT V 
The Court's denial of the Motion to Set Aside can also be supported by the 
provision of U.R.C.P. Rule 12(c) or Rule 56. 
The trial Court, Judge Ballif, at the trial found the Claimant and his Counsel 
absent from the trial after notice had been given to them. Under that circumstance, the 
Court was empowered to consider the case submitted for judgment on the pleadings 
under Rule 12(c) and render judgment accordingly. Since Judge Ballif also took judicial 
notice of the trial evidence submitted in the criminal case, he could also have considered 
the matter pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment, and granted judgment. Either way, 
Judge Davis' ruling was correct under these rules also. 
DATED this < 2 ~ day of March, 1994. 
D E X ^ R I ^ g f e E R S O N 
Millard Cotmty Deputy Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^yJ~^ day of March, 1994,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, United States 
Mail, to the following: 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney at Law 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney at Law 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEMUEL THOMAS SMALL, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 1113 
MOTION FOR 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
June 22, 1990 
At the Hour of 1:35 p.m, 
BEFORE: 
THE HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
APPEARANCES: 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
DEXTER L. ANDERSON, ESQ. 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
750 South Highway 99 
S.R. Box 52 
Fillmore, Utah 8A631 
STEPHEN McCAUGHEY, ESQ. 
72 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were held: 
25 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The matter that's being 
considered by the Court at this time is the applica-
tion of the defendant, Lemuel Thomas Small, for a Certi-
ficate of Probable Cause to appeal the conviction which 
occurred in Millard County earlier — I guess it was 
— I don't remember when. It has been sometime since 
the trial took place. 
How long has it been, Mr. Dexter Ander-
son? 
MR. ANDERSON: We had it on the ~ 
well, it was on the 11th of May is when Mr. Small was 
sentenced to prison. The trial — 
THE COURT: I don't think he's been in 
prison. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I think I stayed the 
execution of the prison sentence pending the disposi-
tion of the Certificate of Probable — Certificate for 
Probable Cause. 
MR. ANDERSON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And Mr. McCaughey? 
2. 
MR, McCAUGHEY: Steve McCaughey. 
THE COURT: Right. 
Youfre taking over for Mr. --
MR. McCAUGHEY: I am. 
Mr. Hatch has been in the hospital the last 
two weeks. 
THE COURT: How's he doing? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Hefs pretty serious. 
They don't know whether he'll be out or not. Hef s 
been there for two weeks, so- I agreed to represent Mr. 
Small in this. 
THE COURT: All right. 
I suppose, Mr. Anderson, that your opposi-
tion to this is expressed in the objection document 
that you filed with the court. 
Did you have anything further that you 
wanted to say about why you think the Court ought not 
to issue this Certificate? 
MR. ANDERSON: Well, I think that the 
statute, Your Honor — as we tried to point out — 
puts the burden on the defendant to show a meritorious 
issue. 
And as I reviewed the Certificate of Probable 
Cause, there's no reference at all as to any testi-
mony or evidence — evidentiary problems or facts that 
3. 
were raised at the trial that might give rise to a 
meritorious appeal. And there's no case authority 
that might be applied to those — the facts of the 
case as the Court heard it that would give rise to any 
support to a meritorious appeal. 
And I think the Court is well aware of 
the cases that we've had from reviewing courts that 
require that there be a real meritorious issue and 
not just a wish on the part of the defendant. Yet 
that's exactly the word that Mr. Hatch used in his 
petition; and that is that he wanted to appeal and 
that he thought he wanted to continue to argue 
about — 
THE COURT: I think the record does 
reflect the position of the defendant with regard to 
the circumstances surrounding the stop on the high-
way. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Right. 
THE COURT: And the fact that there 
really isn't any clear authority in the state of Utah 
for a particular procedure being used, although it has 
been recognized in other states. 
And I took the position that I felt it 
was used in an appropriate manner under those circum-
stances. 
A 
My recollection was that it was a roadblock 
type of stop — 
MR. ANDERSON: Right. 
THE COURT: — that attempted to meet 
the guidelines that were layed down in some of the 
other cases that have come down. But there's been no 
Utah authority on this. 
And the other stop cases like this, where 
you aren't operating on specific probable cause, there 
have been some decisions on. But I don't think this 
issue has been resolved. And that was my feeling as 
to why I didn't look beyond — it didn't — 
It seemed to me there was an affidavit, 
though, that did rely on the suppression. I don't 
know. Maybe not. 
But I had the feeling that that was some-
thing that has merit to it, the position that the 
defendants were taking in the case, and our Supreme 
Court ought to review it if they want to review 
it. 
MR. ANDERSON: Well, I suppose that 
that's the position the defendant has taken. 
All I'm saying is that other than what's 
already been argued before the courts, there's been 
nothing new raised showing a meritorious appeal rising 
5. 
out of the case — 
THE COURT: Well, what has to be a 
meritorious appeal? What makes an appeal meritorious, 
if you're dealing strictly with an area of the law that 
has to do with a possible violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, no local authority in the state of Utah on 
that; some justifying it, some not, and around the 
country? Yet you've got some people going to pri-
son. 
Should they go there awaiting the resolu-
tion? I think they reserve the right to appeal this 
issue on the suppression throughout the trial. That was 
raised by Mr. Hatch and Mr. Harmon. 
MR. ANDERSON: Well, all I'm saying, 
Your Honor, I guess that's the reason I referred to it 
as a wish; that they wished — they wished to appeal 
it and they wish to appeal that question. 
The fact that it hasn't been decided, I 
don't think raises a meritorious issue. 
I think that it simply still is a wish. 
And at least I think that they have the burden of rais-
ing serious question based on federal statute or on 
federal case law on some — 
THE COURT: They raised those in the 
suppression hearing, and all the memorandum that have 
6. 
been filed and arguments on that. 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. I appreciate 
that. 
The other concern I had, Your Honor — and 
I tried to raise my objection — I tried to express 
that in the objection. 
We do have a real serious question about 
whether there really is a bond on appeal, because the 
bondsman did contact me and tell me that he was --
that he did object to the bond that he had posted 
previous to the trial, be continued as an appeal 
bond. 
Now, maybe counsel will solve that prob-
lem. I donr t know. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I can address that. 
MR. ANDERSON: But if he is out on 
appeal, then I want to be sure the bond is — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ANDERSON: -- effective. 
THE COURT: Let Mr. McCaughey go into 
that. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Two things: Let me 
first address the question Mr. Anderson had about meri-
torious appeal. 
State V Neeley I think sets the standard in 
7. 
Utah. And what that case says is that a Certificate 
of Probable Cause should issue if, one, the issues of 
law are substantial. 
They break that down into saying: First, 
it can be a novel issue, ie, there is no Utah deci-
sion of law on that, which I think this meets; or if 
the issue is fairly debateable, if the Utah precedent 
is unclear. And I think that applies in this case both 
ways. 
I think Mr. Harmon, in a motion to recon-
sider, submitted an attachment of Judge Tibbs's opin-
ion where he ruled that there's no statutory authority 
in Utah for a roadblock, and therefore suppressed the 
evidence. So between the District Court there's some 
discrepancy. And there is no Utah Supreme Court or 
Court of Appeals case law on this. 
As far as the bond goes, I spoke with Mr. 
Simone, who has the bond. He has sent down a blank bond 
which may be filled out for whatever amount the Court 
sets, assuming it's reasonable — 
THE COURT: Do you have that with 
you? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I do have that with 
me. 
He's signed it. He's willing to post the 
8. 
1 bond in this matter as we've done before. 
2 Based on that, I would submit it, 
3 I think the issue has been preserved. It's 
4 a question that needs to be resolved. And I think 
5 it's fairly debateable, and it's a novel issue, and it 
6 meets the standards of State V Neeley. 
7 THE COURT: What was the bond that he 
8 was under during the — pendency of the appeal? 
9 MR. ANDERSON: Forty thousand. 
10 I THE COURT: Or the trial. 
11 MR. ANDERSON: $40,000. 
12 THE COURT: $40,000? 
13 I'll adopt that as the amount for the bond 
14 in this section of the case, and I will allow the 
15 execution on the Certificate of Probable Cause. 
16 MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, I have one 
17
 other matter. And that is: I filed with the Court 
18 now — it's a motion to extend the time for filing 
19
 J appeal. 
The 30 days has — the original 30 days has 20 
21
 I passed. 
22
 I According to Rule 4-E of the Utah Rules of 
23 
24 
25 
Appellate Procedure, this Court has the authority to 
extend it another 30 days. 
I'm prepared to file a notice of appeal 
9. 
1
 I today, 
2 I The original 30 days ran June 11th, ajid Mr 
3
 Hatch was in the hospital in intensive care, and has 
4
 been just moved out of there — 
5
 THE COURT: Have you got an affi-
6
 davit or something that supports — 
7
 Oh, here we are. It's in the motion 
8 itself, 
9
 MR. McCAUGHEY: It is. 
10
 It is not an affidavit, but I can swear to 
11
 the Court — 
12
 THE COURT: You have no question about 
13
 that, do you, Mr. Anderson? 
14
 MR. ANDERSON: The only question I 
1
 have is: I'm not sure the Court has the power to 
16
 extend the time for appeal unless it's made within the 
17
 original 30 days. 
18
 THE COURT: Well, I had a case go up 
19 
and come back on that very point. I didn't think I 
20
 did, but I do. 
21 
How did it turn out? Did you read that 
22 
case, Mark? 
23 
It was in the — the one that came out of 
24 
Millard County, the death of the — I don't know. 
25 
It's in the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: It's Rule 4-E of the 
Appellate Procedure. It's real clear that you have 
the power. 
THE COURT: It applies across the 
board, the appellate procedures to both civil and 
criminal. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: It does. 
THE COURT: That was the interpre-
tation I had about that last case, that I do have that 
power. 
MR. ANDERSON: Well, I know I have 
just been arguing that question in Federal Bankruptcy 
Court in California. And itfs different there, I can 
tell you. 
THE COURT: All right. They have dif-
ferent rules there. 
MR. ANDERSON: Yeah. 
THE COURT: The Court will extend the 
time. 
Is there an order here doing that? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I did not prepare an 
order on that. I will send it down, Your Honor. 
I have a Certificate of Probable Cause 
and a notice of appeal, which I will file with the 
Court. 
11. 
If11 prepare an order, 
THE COURT: What's this? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: That's the Certifi-
cate of Probable Cause. 
THE COURT: All right. 
I had already issued one, and I stayed it 
pending the ruling of the Court on the objection that 
Mr. Anderson filed. 
Did anyone ever prepare a — an order 
staying? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I received a minute 
entry from you saying the — 
THE COURT: Stating that it had been 
stayed? 
Well, we'll lift the stay on the Certifi-
cate of Probable Cause, and the Court will allow its 
filing. 
I've already signed — signed it on the 
21st of May. And I need — 
MR. McCAUGHEY: An order? 
THE COURT: — an order on the exten-
sion on time for appeal and — 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I'll send that. 
THE COURT: — I suppose we'll also 
need an order on the bond — 
12. 
n 
1 MR. McCAUGHEY: Judge, in that order 
2 I just submitted, the Certificate of Probable Cause, 
3 there was a place in there for the Court to fill the 
4 bond in, 
5 THE COURT: I've already filled it in 
6 on the original one that I stayed — 
7
 I stayed the execution of the sentence 
8 pending a disposition of the objection to this. 
9 MR. McCAUGHEY: Okay. 
10 J THE COURT: So now I will lift the 
stay of the execution of the sentence. 
12
 I Are you prepared to file that bond? 
13
 Let me see the bond that came down from 
14
 I Mr. Simone. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: The place is blank. 
I just need to fill in the amount. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is all right. 
You fill that in, if you will. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I will. 
THE COURT: And then I'll sign it, 
and we'll have that down to the — when we send the 
22
 | file back. 
23 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
24 
25 
MR. McCAUGHEY: On the notice of 
appeal, do you want me to wait and file that until I 
send the order down from you granting the extension? 
13. 
1 I have it with me. 
2 THE COURT: The notice of appeal? 
3 MR. McCAUGHEY: The notice of appeal. 
4 THE COURT: I don't think you better 
5 file it until I've extended the time. 
6 MR. McCAUGHEY: Okay. 
7
 THE COURT: That would present a prob-
8 lem. 
9 MR. McCAUGHEY: Anything else? 
1
° j THE COURT: I need an order grant-
ing your motion to extend the time for appeal. 
12 | MR. McCAUGHEY: Okay. 
13
 THE COURT: And I guess — you would 
14
 do that for an additional number of days, right? 
15
 MR. McCAUGHEY: I will. 
16
 I THE COURT: Okay. And send that 
down. We'll sign that. 
We'll keep the executed bond here so that 
when the papers all come... 
I don't know what the procedure is now. 
11 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
23 
24 
25 
Would you — 
22 I .r^S^S^^^^I^Jl^^^f^ 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Right. 
THE COURT: Are you here ready to 
start — 
Well, of course he didn't come down ready to 
start serving his time. 
This has to come out of the prison, as I 
understand it. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No. 
Once you grant the Certificate of Probable 
Cause and accept the bail, he's released on bail. 
THE COURT: Released here? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Released here today. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: And subject to any 
further orders of the Court of Appeals or your-
self. 
THE COURT: Okay. I see. 
Had I not stayed it, then he would have 
been released. Yes. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Right. 
THE COURT: All right. 
You have no objection to that procedure I 
guess, Mr. Anderson? 
MR. ANDERSON: No. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Then we'll release Mr. Small at this time. 
And the Court will file the bond with the clerk of the 
15. 
court in Millard County, and we'll grant the motion to 
extend time to appeal. 
And I suspect that's about all we need to 
do right now. 
MR. ANDERSON: Ifm not sure, Your 
Honor, that we have an actual judgment and sentence in 
the file. I know I prepared one. 
We need to get that in the file, too. 
THE COURT: Right. Will you see that 
that — 
MR. ANDERSON: I will make sure that 
that's been sent to you. 
THE COURT: Because he has been sen-
tenced, I know. 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
We just needed to draft the document itself 
and have it signed. 
THE COURT: Okay. Fine. 
MR. ANDERSON: I thought I had it with 
me. I know we had prepared it. It may have been 
mailed. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Then if you'll get that up as soon as 
possible, I'll sign it and return it with all the other 
documents that will come back to you. Okay? 
16. 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Let me — you're going to give me that bond. 
And Ifll keep that with these papers here. 
Will you get on this real quickly? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I'll send them in the 
mail this afternoon. 
THE COURT: All right. Fine. 
All right. We'll be in recess. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded at 1:55 
p.m.) 
17. 
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DEXTER L. ANDERSON, #0084 
MILLARD COUNTY DEPUTY ATTORNEY 
750 South Highway 99 
Star Route Box 52 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Telephone: (801) 743-6522 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
1977 CADILLAC 2 DR. SEDAN 
S#604757Q195013 
Eight Thousand Two Hundred and 
thirty-four dollars and ten cents, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
OPPOSING CLAIMANT'S 
MEMORANDUM, AND AFFIDAVITS 
IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
#8446 
Plaintiff has no quarrel with Claimant's statement of facts, except claimant left out 
one important and crucial fact; 
Stephen McCaughey, Esquire, 72 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
appeared on behalf of Defendant and Claimant Lemuel Thomas Small on June 22.1990. 
in State of Utah vs. Small, Millard County Case #1113, the criminal case referred to in 
Claimants Memorandum, giving rise to this forfeiture proceeding. 
On that date a hearing was held before the Honorable George E. Ballif, in Provo, 
1 
Utah, on Defendant's Motion for Probable Cause in State of Utah vs. Lemuel Thomas 
Small, Case #1113. Atranscript of the said hearing was prepared by Court Reporter Lesley 
S. Nelson dated September 24,1990. At page 2 line 25 of that transcript the Court and Mr. 
McCaughey exchanged the following conversation. It is important to note that Mr. Small 
was present in Court and also heard the following exchange. 
"The Court: and Mr. McCaughey 
Mr. McCaughey: Steve McCaughey 
The Court: Right. You're taking over for Mr. 
Mr. McCaughey: 1 am. Mr. Hatch has been in the hospital that iast two weeks. 
The Court: How's he doing? 
Mr. McCaughey: He's pretty serious. They don't know whether he'll be out or not. 
He's been there for two weeks, so I agreed to represent Mr. Small in this. 
The Court: All right." 
The record will show that Mr. Stephen McCaughey, Esquire, has represented Mr. Small 
ever since that time. 
What is the import of this fact upon Claimant Small's and Stephen McCaughey's 
motion and argument for setting aside the Judgment of Forfeiture in this case? 
Claimant's Motion to set aside is based on a "failure of Counsel argument", I.e. that Sumner 
Hatch failed to properly represent Claimant due to illness and consequent incapacity. The 
Judgment of forfeiture was entered on February 8, 1991. Both Claimant Small and his 
2 
present counsel Stephen McCaughey knew that Sumner Hatch was ill and incapacitated 
nearly eight months prior to the entry of Judgment. They both knew six months prior to the 
trial date. They both now want to claim their failure to take corrective steps in spite of their 
knowledge amounts to failure of due process. Claimant Small knew of Mr. Hatch's illness 
and incapacity. He had actual knowledge that Mr. Hatch was not able to represent him 
because of his illness and incapacity. On June 22,1990, Mr. McCaughey had to appear 
for him in the criminal case. Mr. Small had also retained Mr. Hatch to represent him in the 
forfeiture proceeding. It is only logical that Mr. Small, and his new attorney, both were on 
notice that action needed to be taken in the forfeiture action, if Mr. Small wanted to protect 
his interest. He had the knowledge, duty, and time to act long before the matter was set 
for trial and Judgment was entered. 
Claimant Small alleges that the failure of his counsel Sumner Hatch amounts to 
failure of due process. Mr. Small was given due process in this forfeiture proceeding when 
he was served with a notice of these proceedings. He responded. He retained Sumner 
Hatch to file an answer. All subsequent notices of trial dates, hearings, and continuances 
were sent to Sumner Hatch consistent with the rules of civil procedure, and rules of the 
Court. Notice of trial set for January 30,1991, was mailed to Claimant via his attorney of 
record on December 31,1990 thirty days before the trial date. On January 30,1991 trial 
was held. Claimant Small did not appear nor did counsel. Under such circumstances 
Plaintiffs counsel has no duty to notify Claimant's counsel. (See Central Bank vs. Jensen 
3 
556 P.2d 1009). It was unreasonable for him to assume Sumner Hatch would be able to 
handle the forfeiture case, when he was not able to handle the criminal case. The burden 
was on Claimant Small, because of his knowledge, and the knowledge his new attorney in 
the criminal case had long before the Judgment, concerning Mr. Hatch's incapacity. In LLfL 
vs. Woburn 928 F.2d 1, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, had this to 
say about a claimant that wanted to avoid a Judgment because of gross neglect of his 
former counsel. This is the same argument advanced by Claimant Small in this case. 
"The final argument of claimant is that Rule 60(b)(6) should be applied 
because of the gross neglect of its former counsel. Such a claim has 
generally been rejected by the Supreme Court: 
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of 
petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an 
unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his 
representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of 
the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be 
wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each 
party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to 
have "notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney." 
Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326, 25 L Ed. 955. 
This principal of law is particularly applicable to this case, where claimant Small 
knew long before any Judgment of forfeiture was entered, that his original counsel was ill 
and incapacitated. He made his choice, and can not now claim a denial of due process. 
The motion to set aside must be overruled and denied. 
Forfeiture is an In Rem proceeding. Action lies against the Res or item itself, rather 
than against the owner or a person. See U.C.A. 58-32-13 (9)(h). and See 36 AmJur 2d §1 
4 
page 611. In this case the Res was a 1977 Cadillac and $8,234.10 in cash. Based on the 
procedure before the Court, the Court ordered forfeiture of both the car and cash. The car 
and cash are gone, once forfeited and turned over the to the agency the Res is gone. It no 
longer is in the control of the Court, and the Court has no jurisdiction over the car and 
money. In essence the question of setting aside the Judgment is moot. Even if the 
Judgment is set aside there is no Res within the jurisdiction of the Court. There does not 
seem to be any Utah Appellate cases on this point but see U.S.A. v. Tit's Lounge 873 F.2d 
141; Since this Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed any further, Claimants Motion must be 
overruled and denied. 
U.C.A. 58-37-13 Property Subject to Forfeiture, states that 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right 
exists in them... 
(a) all controlled substances.... 
(e) ail conveyances.... 
(g) ...all monies.... 
The forfeiture of the controlled substance, money found in proximity thereto, and the car 
transporting them occurred long before Claimant Small reached the road block. Therefore 
Small had no property right in them and has no standing to object to their seizure by law 
enforcement, (as opposed to his constitutional right against unreasonable search and 
seizure that may have resulted in a conviction and loss of his freedom) irregardless of the 
illegal roadblock. 
5 
Claimant's lack of standing is also clear from another perspective. Small was the 
passenger in the vehicle. Shoulderblade was the driver. Another person not present 
owned the car. Passengers in automobiles do not have standing to object to search and 
seizures relating to the automobile. Claimant Small can not advance a meritorious defense 
to this forfeiture action based on the search and seizure of the automobile at the roadblock. 
This Is far different than Defendant Small suppressing the use of evidence seized from the 
automobile in his criminal case where his personal freedom and rights were at stake. 
Eakas v. Illinois 439 u. S. 128. 
Claimant Small has no standing to seek relief from the Judgment, and his Motion 
must be overruled and denied. 
DATED this ^ ' day of y ^ - u ^
 % ^ 993. 
DEXT^fe^ANDERSON 
Millard County Deputy Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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MEMORANDUM OPPOSING CLAIMANTS MEMORANDUM. AND AFFIDAVITS IN 
SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT, in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, this J 2 7 ^ day of January, 1993, to the following: 
Stephen McCaughey 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary 
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